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I. INTRODUCTION
In August 2011, the small city of Central Falls, Rhode Island
petitioned a bankruptcy court for protection under Chapter 9 of the
bankruptcy code.1 A mere fourteen months later—in October 2012—
Central Falls emerged from bankruptcy in what has been described as
possibly the fastest Chapter 9 proceeding in U.S. history.2 At the time
Central Falls sought protection from its creditors, it had approximately
† Professor of Law, Boston University. A.B., 1982, magna cum laude, Harvard
University; J.D., 1985, Yale Law School.
I am indebted to participants at the January 2013 AALS Employee Benefits
Section meeting for helpful comments on a preliminary draft of this paper. Thanks to
Michael Cannella and Harrison Kaplan for excellent research assistance.
1. 11 U.S.C.A. § 921a-e (West 2008). As of 2010, Central Falls has only 19,376
residents. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENTRAL FALLS (CITY) QUICKFACTS (2010)
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/44/4414140.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2014).
2. Jess Bidgood, Plan to End Bankruptcy in Rhode Island City Gains Approval, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/07/us/central-falls-ri-to-emergefrom-bankruptcy.html (stating that Judge Frank J. Bailey of U.S. Bankruptcy Court
remarks on “record time, and record efficiency”).
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$80 million in unfunded pension liabilities3 and was running an annual
budget deficit of about $5 million per year.4 As in other recent cases of
extreme municipal financial crisis, Central Falls’ bondholders’ rights
were well protected; the restructuring that was ultimately approved
imposed virtually all of the costs onto current and former municipal
employees and taxpayers. Indeed, city services were slashed as an
astonishing one third of public employees were fired at the same time
that a 4% increase in property taxes was imposed for fiscal years 2012
through 2017. Current retirees’ pension payments were reduced by
approximately 55%5 and cost of living adjustments (COLAs) were
eliminated.6 Those employees whose jobs survived the cost cutting had
to contribute more and work longer in order to earn a pension.7
It was not a foregone conclusion that public employees, pensioners,
and taxpayers would bear the cost of restructuring. Indeed, Chapter 9

3. This is admittedly a small number compared with the eye-popping figure of $3.5
billion for the City of Detroit, which sought bankruptcy protection on July 18, 2013.
Steven Yaccino & Michael Cooper, Cries of Betrayal As Detroit Plans to Cut Pensions,
N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/22/us/cries-of-betrayal-asdetroit-plans-to-cut-pensions.html?pagewanted=all.
4. MARK A. PFEIFFER, OFFICE OF THE RECEIVER, CITY OF CENTRAL FALLS, IN THE
MATTER OF THE RECEIVERSHIP OF CENTRAL FALLS, RHODE ISLAND (2010) (Executive
Summary), available at http://www.dor.ri.gov/Reports/Central%20Falls/Report%20of%
20the%20State%20Receiver.pdf; Michael McDonald & David McLaughlin, ‘Dire’
Finances Force R.I. City Into Bankruptcy, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 1, 2011),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-01/-dire-situation-forces-rhode-island-city-ofcentral-falls-into-bankruptcy.html.
5. This figure was reduced to approximately 25% by a special assessment from the
Rhode Island legislature of $2.6 million to be paid out over five years to Central Falls.
2012 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 241, art. 22.
6. Id.; Dan McGowan, Judge Gives OK to Providence Pension Deal, WPRI (Mar.
12, 2013, 9:00 PM), http://www.wpri.com/dpp/news/local_news/providence/judge-givesok-to-providence-pension-deal; Robert Powell, Public Pension Funds Face Vast
Shortfall, MARKETWATCH (Nov. 13, 2012), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/publicpension-funds-face-vast-shortfall-2012-11-13 (“[S]tates such as Colorado, Florida,
Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Washington and Wyoming have made or can make major cuts to the cost-of-living
adjustments (COLA) pensioners were supposed to get.”).
7. In 1999 and 2000, state legislatures across the United States began decreasing the
age at which employees could receive full retirement benefits and shortening the years of
service needed to qualify. The ultimate result was that, when these pension programs are
reformed, employees are forced to contribute more, mainly due to poor decisions by
legislatures in the early part of the century. See PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, PROMISES
WITH A PRICE: PUBLIC SECTOR RETIREMENT BENEFITS 8-9 (2006), available at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/State_policy/pension
_report.pdf.
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does not mandate such a result.8 The Rhode Island legislature, apparently
eager to avoid contagion,9 hastily passed a statute giving bondholders
preference over all other creditors and guaranteeing payment of Central
Falls’ debt obligations.10 The legislature was widely viewed as anxious to
avoid contagion—i.e., to reduce the possibility that other Rhode Island
municipalities would find themselves unable to finance public projects
by borrowing because bondholders believed Central Falls problems were
“contagious” and likely to spread throughout the state.11 This law and not
8. Chapter 9 requires only that the debtor file a plan of adjustment and enforces no
standard requirements on the plan itself. The court confirms the plan, among other
formalities, if the debtor is not prohibited by law from taking any action necessary to
carry out the plan, and “the plan is in the best interests of creditors and is feasible.” 11
U.S.C.A. § 943 (West 2008). Judges obviously carry a large amount of discretion when it
comes to determining what is in the best interest of creditors and what is feasible, making
each Chapter 9 case somewhat unique. For arguments that bondholders could bear some
or most of the cost of restructuring, see David A. Skeel, States of Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI.
L. REV. 677, 702 (2012).
Two constituencies in particular have been asked to bear a disproportionate
percentage of the sacrifice during the recent crisis: the state’s public employees
and the recipients—especially the poor and lower middle class recipients—of
its services. Other, similarly situated creditors such as bondholders have not
been expected to bear any of the financial burden.
Id. For an account of what led to the bankruptcy filing of Bridgeport, see Dorothy Brown,
Fiscal Distress and Politics: The Bankruptcy Filing of Bridgeport as a Case Study in
Reclaiming Local Sovereignty, 11 BANKR. DEV. J. 625, 629 (1994-95). For a further
introduction to municipal bankruptcy, see Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker,
When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI.
L. REV. 425 (1993).
9. Contagion refers to the possibility that a municipality’s default will cause
disruption in other nearby bond markets because instability in one market may be a sign
of general instability in the area. Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will,
and Strategic Use of Municipal Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 302 (2012); Tracy
Gordon, What the Stockton Municipal Bankruptcy Means, And Doesn’t, BROOKINGS
(Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/04/02-stockton-citybankruptcy-gordon (discussing the effects of contagion in the municipal bond market);
Rabah Arezki et al., Are There Spillover Effects from Munis? (Int’l Monetary Fund Inst.,
Working Paper No. WP/11/290, 2011), available at http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp11290.pdf (suggesting that the market for municipal bonds
are “prone not to contagion but rather to flight to quality”).
10. R.I.
GEN.
LAWS
§
45-12-1
(2013),
available
at
http://webserver.rilin.state.ri.us/Statutes/title45/45-12/45-12-1.HTM.
The faith and credit, ad valorem taxes, and general fund revenues of each city,
town and district shall be pledged for the payment of the principal of, premium
and the interest on, all general obligation bonds and notes of the city or town
whether or not the pledge is stated in the bonds or notes, or in the proceedings
authorizing their issue and shall constitute a first lien on such ad valorem taxes
and general fund revenues.
Id. § 45-12-10.
11. Gillette, supra note 9, at 302.
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Chapter 9 all but guaranteed that the years of overspending and generally
irresponsible financial stewardship of the city would be corrected
without significant cost to the bondholders and their insurers.
If Central Falls’ financial problems were isolated or peculiar and
unusual, one might be forgiven for asking why it is worth focusing on the
misadventures of a small city in a very small state. After years of relative
obscurity, Chapter 9 is currently the focus of considerable attention12
precisely because Central Falls’ financial woes are clearly part of a larger
pattern of municipal crisis. Not since the Great Depression have so many
cities across the United States faced bankruptcy. Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania; Stockton, California; Jefferson County, Alabama; and
most recently Detroit, Michigan have made headlines as the harsh
realities of imprudent financial decisions, corruption, and overspending
collided. And, although the facts vary slightly from city to city, the
overarching question raised in each municipal bankruptcy proceeding is
similar: which creditors, if any, should be given preference as a city
12. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A
Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425 (1993)
(“explor[ing] the meaning of bankruptcy in the context of municipal corporations and
what this has to say about the legal structure of cities and their relation to their citizens,
their states, their creditors, and the courts”); Richard W. Trotter, Running on Empty:
Municipal Insolvency and Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements in Chapter 9
Bankruptcy, 36 S. ILL. U. L.J. 45, 47 (2011) (“examin[ing] the depth and scope of the
municipal debt crisis and assess[ing] the role of collective bargaining agreements in that
crisis”); Jeffrey B. Ellman & Daniel J. Merrett, Pensions and Chapter 9: Can
Municipalities Use Bankruptcy to Solve Their Pension Woes?, 27 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J.
365, 373 (2012) (“identif[ying] certain tools and strategies offered by Chapter 9 and . . .
consider[ing] whether . . . they may offer a real, workable solution to the overwhelming
and seemingly unassailable pension obligations of many municipal debtors”); Eric S.
Pommer & Marc M. Friedman, Municipal Bankruptcy and its Effect on Government
Contractors, 25 PUB. CONT. L. J. 249 (1996) (giving a historical overview of municipal
bankruptcy legislation and Chapter 9 applicability to government contractors); Hannah
Heck, Solving Insolvent Public Pensions: The Limitations of the Current Bankruptcy
Option, 28 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 89, 91 (2011) (“summariz[ing] current economic
factors driving the recent increased likelihood of municipal insolvency”); David A. Roby,
Jr., Municipal Bankruptcy: Will Labor be Forced to Take the Proverbial Haircut?, 26
GA. L. REV. 959, 961 (1992) (giving a basic overview of Chapter 9, in addition to tracing
the history of municipal bankruptcy law); Elizabeth M. Watkins, In Defense of the
Chapter 9 Option: Exploring the Promise of a Municipal Bankruptcy as a Mechanism for
Structural Political Reform, 39 J. LEGIS. 89, 91 (2012) (providing an “overview of
Chapter 9 itself, including its benefits, costs, and causes”); Kevin A. Kordana, Tax
Increases in Municipal Bankruptcies, 83 VA. L. REV. 1035, 1039 (1997) (analyzing the
mechanics of a Chapter 9 proceeding and examining “municipalities’ ability to use
Chapter 9 and the status of investors as claimants in a Chapter 9 proceeding”); Guy R.
Bissonnette, Rhode Island Municipal Insolvency Lite, 60 R.I. B.J. 19 (Jan./Feb. 2012)
(providing a question/answer format that gives a general overview of Chapter 9 and the
bankruptcy in Central Falls).
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struggles to rein in spending? If the core problem is, as I’ve argued
elsewhere,13 a strong tendency to overpromise because of strong forces
that encourage morally hazardous behavior, who should bear the cost
when a municipality cannot keep the promises it made? Does it matter
that municipal creditors are typically either very sophisticated—i.e.,
bondholders and their insurers—or possibly less savvy but often
intimately involved in a long pattern of reckless spending that has
directly contributed to the financial crisis—i.e., public employees and the
unions that represent them?
This paper examines these questions through the lens of experience
in Central Falls, Rhode Island for two reasons. First the decline in
Central Falls was typical of patterns found in other cities like Stockton,
Harrisburg, and Detroit. Second, Central Falls provides a unique
opportunity to evaluate the principal argument in favor of protecting
bondholders—the need to stop the downward spiral known as contagion.
The contagion claim clearly dominated the way in which Rhode Island
approached the question whether to protect bondholders or retirees and
other creditors of the municipality. In Part II, I provide a short history of
the economic rise and decline of Central Falls and describe the state’s
role in limiting the danger that Central Falls’ problems would spread to
other cities in the state. Part III reviews the claims of the bondholders
and their insurers and considers whether those claims are inherently
superior to those creditors with contractually based post-employment
claims—generally, promised pension and retiree health benefits. Part IV
evaluates Rhode Island’s decision to avoid contagion by giving explicit
preference to bondholders; this preference tied the hands of the
bankruptcy court and made certain that the costs of restructuring would
fall heavily on current retirees and employees. Finally, in Part V, I look
closely at the lessons other cities should draw from Central Falls’
experience. I conclude that the core problem in Central Falls and
elsewhere is one of extreme moral hazard that is unchecked due to
corruption, cynicism, and willful ignorance. Bondholders, however, are
generally fully insured through a mechanism that spreads the costs of
default across a wide spectrum of citizens outside of the city, so the
question of whether to protect them ultimately depends on exactly where
one locates fault for the city’s ruined financial condition.

13. Maria O’Brien Hylton, Combating Moral Hazard: The Case for Rationalizing
Public Employee Benefits, 45 IND. L. REV. 413 (2012).
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II. PAINFUL CHANGE IN CENTRAL FALLS
Central Falls is the smallest and most densely populated city in the
State of Rhode Island.14 Only 1.29 square miles in total, it is more
densely populated than the city of Boston. The basic statistics tell a
rough tale. More than 27% of the population of Central Falls lives below
the poverty level. Set along the Blackstone River, Central Falls began as
a textile mill town and is located just north of its larger and more
prosperous neighbor, Providence. Although the mills are long gone,
Central Falls has continued to offer cheap housing and to draw
significant numbers of immigrants—mostly from Central and South
America.
In 1990, local politicians, eager for a revenue source, proposed
building a jail to house nonviolent federal detainees.15 The idea was that
the jail would provide a reliable stream of income that would help the
city avoid financial collapse. In order to build the facility, Central Falls
issued $30 million in bonds that were ultimately used to construct the
Donald W. Wyatt Detention Facility (Wyatt).16 A few years later, the city
refinanced this loan that required another $38 million bond issue.17
14. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 1.
15. See Nina Bernstein, City of Immigrants Fills Jail Cells With Its Own, N.Y. TIMES,
(Dec. 27, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/27/us/27detain.html?pagewanted=
all&_r=2&.
The city was nearly bankrupt in 1990 when developers made a proposition:
Build a profit-making jail for two or three hundred nonviolent federal
detainees, and guarantee a steady stream of money and jobs for Central Falls.
But the deal that emerged, like many elsewhere, proved better at paying private
investors than generating public revenue.
Id.; see also History of the Facility, DONALD W. WYATT DETENTION FACILITY,
http://www.wyattdetention.com/index.cfm?pg=20&pgtitle=History (last visited Mar. 19,
2014).
16. See Bernstein, supra note 15 (“The municipal corporation borrowed $30 million
through a state bond issue to build Wyatt, and hired the Cornell company to run it.”); see
also Eileen Norcross, Behind the Scenes in Central Falls: Correctional Facilities as
Economic Development?, MERCATUS CENTER AT GEO. MASON U. (Aug. 2, 2011),
http://neighborhoodeffects.mercatus.org/2011/08/02/behind-the-scenes-in-central-fallscorrectional-facilities-as-economic-development.
In 1991, the city, operating through a newly-created state entity, “the
Central Falls Detention Facility Corporation”
(CFDFC) made an
intergovernmental agreement with the U.S. Marshals Service to operate the
Wyatt Detention Facility in order to “pursue economic development through
the acquisition or construction of correctional facilities.”
Wyatt is tax-exempt and is supposed to make an annual payment to the city,
[sic] “In this way, Wyatt would still provide the City with the benefit of
economic development—tax revenue for the City—but would do so in the form
of an impact fee payment rather than through taxes.”
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The plan for Wyatt was straightforward: the city would receive
revenue subject to a per capita fee arrangement—i.e., as the inmate
population increased, the city’s revenue would likewise increase.18 Early
on, the revenue from Wyatt proved disappointing.19 After the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, and with the federal government’s
increased focus on illegal immigration, Wyatt’s inmate count began to
rise.20 Encouraged by this trend, then-mayor Charles Moreau supported a
plan in 2005 that more than doubled the maximum occupancy of Wyatt.
This expansion cost the city another $47 million.21 (One of the many
The quasi-public CFDFC was to oversee Wyatt which now houses about
700 detainees. Building of the facility was financed by $30 million in revenue
bonds, and a 2005 expansion financed by another $106 million in bonds. Per
diem payments from the U.S. Marshals Service were to repay the bonds. But, a
decreased number of detainees from Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(due to the death of a detainee), led to a decrease in projected revenues at the
facility. Thus, CFDFC suspended payments to Central Falls. A fact
compounded by Central Falls’ inability to accurately budget for the loss (they
continued to budget as if they would receive payments).
Id.
17. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 15 (“Six years later, the municipal body borrowed
$38 million to refinance, buying back most of the bonds at a premium that gave the
original bondholders a lump-sum return of 28.5 percent on their investment in addition to
9 percent annual interest.”).
18. Central Falls was due to receive per diem payments from the U.S. Marshals
Service to help repay the bonds. In addition, although tax-exempt, Wyatt was supposed to
make an annuals payment to the city based on the number of detainees. See Norcross,
supra note 16.
19. See Bernstein, supra note 15 (“At best, Wyatt paid Central Falls $2 to $3 a day for
each detainee—less than $400,000 in the good years—to offset its use of city services.”).
In December 2008, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) halted the placement of
federal immigration detainees at Wyatt due to an investigation surrounding the treatment
of a Chinese computer engineer who died in custody at Wyatt. Decreased numbers of
detainees resulted in decreased revenues that did not match projections. Central Falls
compounded on this error by failing to re-budget for the loss. See Nina Bernstein,
Detention Center Facing Inquiry Will Get No More Immigrant Detainees, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 6, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/06/nyregion/06detain.html; see also
Norcross, supra note 16.
20. After the creation of ICE in 2003, Wyatt became one of 654 facilities used to
temporarily house federal immigration detainees prior to transfer or deportation. The
number of detainees transferred out of Wyatt to other ICE facilities increased by over
800% between 2000 and 2008. Detainees Leaving ICE Detention from the Wyatt
Detention Center, TRANSACTIONAL REC. ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, SYRACUSE U.,
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/detention/200803/WYATTRI/tran/ (last visited Mar. 19,
2014) (providing data from October 1998 to March 2008); see also Bernstein, supra note
15 (“The payoff came after 9/11 in an accelerating stream of new detainees: foreigners
swept up by the nation’s rising furor over illegal immigration.”); Overview, ICE,
http://www.ice.gov/about/overview/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2014).
21. See, e.g., History of the Facility, supra note 15.
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ironies of the Wyatt project is that its expansion directly and personally
affected residents of Central Falls; numerous families consisted of
parents who were in the United States illegally and children who were
U.S. citizens. Parents as taxpayers expected benefits from the revenue
stream that Wyatt promised; at the same time, Wyatt posed a direct threat
to those same taxpayers whose immigration status was compromised.)22

22. See Bernstein, supra note 15. For example,
Few in this threadbare little mill town gave much thought to the Donald
W. Wyatt Detention Facility, the maximum-security jail beside the public ball
fields at the edge of town. Even when it expanded and added barbed wire,
Wyatt was just the backdrop for Little League games, its name stitched on the
caps of the team it sponsored.
Then people began to disappear: the leader of a prayer group at St.
Matthew’s Roman Catholic Church; the father of a second grader at the public
charter school; a woman who mopped floors in a Providence courthouse.
After days of searching, their families found them locked up inside
Wyatt—only blocks from home, but in a separate world.
....
If anything, the people of Central Falls saw Wyatt as the economic engine
that city fathers had promised, a steady source of jobs and federal money to pay
for services like police and fire protection. Even that, it turns out, was an
illusion.
....
[Maynor Canté, 26,] spoke near-fluent English, and had spent thousands
of dollars trying to legalize his status. Mornings, he cleaned a factory for $8 an
hour. Evenings, he worked at his nephew’s new clothing shop on Dexter Street,
one of several Latino businesses that had revived a bleak stretch of vacant
storefronts.
Then, early one morning in October 2007 when he headed out the door for
his cleaning job, five immigration agents hustled him into a van. That night, as
frightened relatives tried to find him, he was delivered to Wyatt in chains.
....
In Central Falls, the crackdown sowed panic. At the public charter school
two blocks from Wyatt, parents, already afraid to be photographed at school
events, were now reluctant to drive to meetings, said Sarah Friedman, a founder
of the school.
An 8-year-old girl, one of the school’s high-scoring students, stopped
speaking in class when her father disappeared into detention, the girl’s mother
said. Without his income, mother and daughter, United States citizens, were
almost evicted from their apartment.
At Central Falls High School, some students stopped coming to class
because their families had gone into hiding, said Margie Cruz, a school-home
liaison: “The child was born here, the child is legal. But the family has to hide
because the father will be deported.”
“I’ve seen students stopped for a traffic violation and the whole family got
deported,” she added. “Children that were here for years. I watched them grow
up.”
Id.
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In the fall of 2012, Mayor Moreau resigned and pled guilty to federal
corruption charges.23 Moreau’s downfall was a scheme that involved
offering lucrative contracts to board up abandoned homes to one Michael
Bouthillette, a close friend. The city paid Bouthillette $14,000 to $16,000
per home even though the going rate for this kind of work was closer to
$5000 per home.24 Moreau was sentenced to two years in prison; Mr.
Bouthillette received three years probation.25
By the time Moreau went to prison, Wyatt was barely generating
enough cash to cover the required payments to bondholders; revenue for
the city was nearly zero.26 In March 2012, attorneys for the city’s
bondholders sent a letter to Wyatt “emphatically” noting that
bondholders must be compensated and Wyatt’s reserve accounts must be
replenished before the city could collect any money.27
23. See, e.g.¸ Jess Bidgood, Rhode Island: Central Falls Mayor Quits and Is to Plead
Guilty to Corruption, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2012, at A21, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/20/us/rhode-island-central-falls-mayor-quits-and-is-toplead-guilty-to-corruption.html.
24. NBC News and Wire Services, Mayor of Bankrupt Central Falls, RI, Resigns, Set
to Plead Guilty to Corruption, NBC NEWS (Sept. 19, 2012, 1:53 PM),
http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/09/19/13964989-mayor-of-bankrupt-centralfalls-ri-resigns-set-to-plead-guilty-to-corruption.
25. Id.; Erika Niedowski, Former Central Falls Mayor Gets Two Years in Prison,
BOSTON.COM
(Feb.
12,
2013),
http://www.boston.com/news/local/rhodeisland/2013/02/12/former-central-falls-mayor-gets-years-prison/Fb98rVGBsl2u7nDTE18
yIO/story.html.
26. See generally W. Zachary Malinowski, Wyatt Jail Bondholders Will Not OK
Impact
Fees
to
Central
Falls,
PROVIDENCE J.
(Mar.
16,
2012),
http://news.providencejournal.com/breaking-news/2012/03/wyatt-jail-bond.html
(explaining that Wyatt must pay bondholders and replenish reserve accounts before
Central Falls can get any money).
27. CENTRAL FALLS DETENTION FACILITY CORPORATION, MEETING MINUTES (Mar. 13,
2012),
available
at
http://sos.ri.gov/documents/publicinfo/omdocs/minutes/
4440/2012/26330.pdf.
Chairman Hartford said that Mr. Fair received a letter from Mintz-Levin
[the bondholder attorneys]. Basically, as long as the Bondholders consider us to
be in technical default of the indenture of trust, they are not going to allow the
payment of impact fees to the City. We will have to revisit this at a later time.
Attorney Fracassa commented that we have not violated the indenture todate. We have simply asked the Bondholders to make the payment of impact
fees through the mechanism that we have available to do that.
Chairman Hartford commented that, if we were not in an adversarial
relationship with the Bondholders before, we are now. They are forestalling us
from being able to provide revenues to the City.
Id. at 3; see also Malinowski, supra note 26 (reporting that the law firm representing the
bondholders sent the letter “in response to a request by Michael V. Fair, the jail’s chief
executive officer, who sought advice on whether the jail can pay the city $25,000-amonth”).
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Throughout the entire Wyatt episode, Central Falls never missed a
bond payment; it managed to stay current on the municipal debt
primarily by failing to fund pensions promised to its public employees.28
By the time the city sought bankruptcy protection, its unfunded pension
and retiree health obligations exceeded $80 million.29 Although the
Central Falls story clearly involved political malfeasance and corruption,
it is also a story of bondholders that made loans of questionable quality30
and public employees that continued to push for and receive promises for
future benefits that clearly were unaffordable.31
28. See Office of the Governor, R.I., Governor Lincoln D. Chafee Announces
Moody’s Upgrade of Central Falls Bond Rating (Oct. 26, 2012), available at
http://www.ri.gov/press/view/17735 (explaining that Central Falls never missed a debt
service payment); see also Daniel Fisher, Muni Bankruptcies Set Up War Between
Pensioners
and
Bondholders,
FORBES
(Apr.
3,
2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2013/04/03/muni-bankruptcies-set-up-warbetween-pensioners-and-bondholders/ (explaining that Central Falls reworked pension
obligations in bankruptcy, and there is mounting opposition to this practice among labor
unions).
29. Erika Niedowski, Central Falls, R.I., Files for Bankruptcy; Layoffs Loom, USA
TODAY (Aug. 1, 2011), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/economy/2011-08-01central-falls-bankruptcy_n.htm.
30. Moody’s Investors Service downgraded Central Falls credit rating three times in
thirteen months, going from a Baa1 rating in May 2010 to a Caa1 rating in June 2011.
MOODY’S CORP., CENTRAL FALLS, RI – MOODY’S RESEARCH REPORTS (May 2010-July
2013), available at http://www.municipalbonds.com/bonds/moodys_reports_by_issuer/
153447/.
31. See Jack M. Beermann, The Public Pension Crisis, 70 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 3,
87 (2013):
If workers or their unions understood that their contributions were based on
projected returns that were way out of line with the market, it might not seem
unfair to make them bear some of the pain of the shortfall that has
resulted, . . . state and local workers were induced to accept and remain in their
jobs in part based on the pension promises that were continually made during
their employment.
Id.; see also Mary Williams & Abby Goodnough, A Small City’s Depleted Pension Fund
Rattles
Rhode
Island,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
12,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/12/business/central-falls-ri-faces-bankruptcy-overpension-promises.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
[O]ver the years [Central Falls] has promised police officers and firefighters
retirement benefits like those offered in big, rich states like California and New
York. These uniformed workers can retire after just 20 years of service, receive
free health care in retirement, and qualify for full disability pensions when only
partly disabled.
....
. . . It is hard to see how anyone thought such an impoverished tax base could
come up with an additional $80 million for retirement benefits. If the city were
contributing the recommended amount to the plan each year, it would take 57
percent of local property tax revenue.
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While each municipal bankruptcy case is unique with respect to the
precise missteps that led to its financial crisis,32 the modern cases share
numerous similarities. As many have noted,33 bondholders are typically
described as “sophisticated” and well positioned to evaluate and price the
risk associated with any particular municipality’s debt. Except in cases of
Daniel L. Beardsley Jr., executive director of the Rhode Island League of
Cities and Towns, said it was not the city’s idea. Other states limit what can be
decided in collective bargaining, but Rhode Island’s law says that for police
and firefighters, “wages, hours and any and all terms or conditions of
employment” are subject to negotiation.
“That means even the length of a mustache,” said Mr. Beardsley, who
over many years has represented Central Falls and other municipalities in
contract negotiations. Talks broke down more often than not, he said, and then
the same state law called for binding arbitration, which for many years was a
clubby process that emphasized comparable benefits all across the state more
than any city’s ability to pay.
“It was a domino effect,” he said, leaving Rhode Island with the nation’s
highest per capita spending for fire services and sixth-highest for policing. (The
binding arbitration law does not apply to public workers other than police
officers and firefighters in the state, although some want it extended to
teachers.).
Id.; Catherine Welch, Rhode Island City Starts Fiscal Year In The Red, NPR (July 13,
2011, 4:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/2011/07/13/137811877/rhode-island-city-startsfiscal-year-in-the-red.
There were some questionable transactions between politicians and their
friends. And when the state-appointed receiver combed the city’s books he
found no evidence of any financial planning in the last several years. So to raise
cash, he hiked property taxes by a whopping 19 percent, which few could
afford.
....
Central Falls hasn’t fully funded the pension in six years.
Id.
32. See generally Michael Cooper, An Incinerator Becomes Harrisburg’s Money Pit,
N.Y.
TIMES,
May
21,
2010,
at
A14,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/21/us/21harrisburg.html?_r=0
(reporting
that
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania filed Chapter 9 largely due to a failed trash incinerator project);
Melinda Dickinson, Alabama County Files Biggest Municipal Bankruptcy, REUTERS
(Nov.
10,
2011),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/10/us-usa-alabamajeffersoncounty-idUSTRE7A94CP20111110 (reporting that Jefferson County, Alabama
filed Chapter 9 almost entirely due to a failed sewer system project). See, for example,
Brown, supra note 8, for a general discussion of the events that led Bridgeport which
included “cost overruns at the city-owned nursing home”.
33. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 9 (“[S]hocks are transmitted slowly through the
system. More educated institutional investors are probably able to sort good apples from
bad; other investors simply ‘buy and hold.’”); see also Arezki, supra note 9.
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alleged fraud,34 some have argued that bondholders should bear the
burden in the event of municipal default because a city’s other creditors
simply cannot afford to.35 In addition, although less frequently noted,
bondholders carry insurance that protects them in the event of default;
other municipal creditors typically have nowhere to turn when the city
cannot meet its obligations to them.
A. Insurers of Municipal Debt
The market for insurance for bondholders is currently dominated by
two underwriters: Assured Guaranty Municipal36 (AGM) and Build
America Mutual37 (BAM). AGM and BAM issue what is commonly

34. In Jefferson County, bonds were backed by sewer system revenue. However,
there was also an agreement with county commissioners to keep rates high enough to
meet their obligations. Jefferson County largely ignored this promise and further
exacerbated the issue by voting to reduce rates in 2009. Four out of the five people on the
county commission have since been convicted of taking bribes and sentenced to prison.
The fifth was convicted of obstructing justice. Floyd Norris, Portent of Peril for Muni
Bondholders, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/07/business/
bankruptcy-in-alabama-county-offers-warning-for-other-municipalities.html?pagewanted
=all. For a similar example of a monoline insurer claiming a city is not dealing in good
faith, see Steven Greenhut, California Bankruptcies Shield Retirees, Not Bondholders,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-09/californiabankruptcies-shield-retirees-not-bondholders.html.
Stockton’s attempt to transfer the cost of lucrative, above-market employee
wages and benefits granted when tax revenues were flush to capital markets
creditors by haircutting bond principal is unprecedented, a contortion of the
bankruptcy process and will foreclose Stockton’s access to the capital markets
for the foreseeable future.
Id.
35. See Beermann, supra note 31, at 92 (“[T]he possibility of a large-scale bailout
should at least be part of the conversation. Retirees are entitled to at least as much
consideration as financial institutions and government bondholders.”); see also Skeel,
supra note 8.
36. “Assured Guaranty Ltd. is a Bermuda-based insurance holding company that
trades on the New York Stock Exchange with the ticker symbol AGO.” About Us,
ASSURED GUARANTY, http://assuredguaranty.com/about-us (last visited Feb. 2, 2014). For
an example of Chapter 9 related litigation in which AGM is currently involved, see In re
City of Stockton, Cal., 486 B.R. 194 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013); see also In re Jefferson
Cnty., Ala., 491 B.R. 277 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2013); see also In re City of Harrisburg, PA,
462 B.R. 510 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2013).
37. Build America Mutual is a relatively new insurer (launched July 2012) that
“insures municipal bonds exclusively and as a result, claims to have no legacy exposure
to mortgage-backed bonds, derivatives or other structured financings.” BAM Q&A, BUILD
AMERICA MUTUAL, http://buildamerica.com/wp-content/plugins/statementUploader/
uploads/BAMQA.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2014).
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referred to as monoline insurance, which dates back to at least 1971.38
Prior to the subprime mortgage crisis, there were six monoline insurers
that carried an “AAA” rating, the highest rating possible: Ambac, CIFG
Guaranty (CIFG), Financial Guaranty Insurance Company (FGIC),
Financial Security Assurance (FSA), National (formerly MBIA), and XL
Capital Assurance (XLCA).39 In 2008, Assured Guaranty Ltd. acquired
FSA to form AGM, and it remains the only monoline insurer of the six
continuing to write new business. BAM is the newest underwriter of
monoline policies and describes itself as the industry’s “first mutual bond
insurer,” which apparently means that unlike AGM, BAM is owned by
the very creditors it insures and not by stockholders.40 In 2012, AGM
accounted for 99.8% of the $13.2 billion of new municipal debt.41
Although some have suggested that BAM is on the rise,42 AGM’s market
share has made it, in effect, the only carrier in the market at the present
time.43
As the sole carrier, one would expect AGM to exercise significant
monopoly power with respect to setting rates for insureds. For the past
several years, bondholders have had almost no ability to shop
competitively for monoline insurance, although this is changing as
BAM’s market share continues to grow.44 Under these conditions, it is

38. See WELLS FARGO ADVANTAGE FUNDS, DETERIORATION OF MONOLINE INSURANCE
COMPANIES AND THE REPERCUSSIONS FOR MUNICIPAL BONDS (2008), available at
http://www.wellsfargoadvantagefunds.com/pdf/whitepapers/monoline_insurance_muni_b
onds.pdf.
39. See id.
40. See BAM Q&A, supra note 37.
41. U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE FISCAL
YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2012–ASSURED GUARANTY LTD. 75 (2013), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1273813/000127381313000006/ago12312012x10k.htm.
42. See Alan Schankel, Build America Mutual Assurance: Janney Fixed Income
Strategy, JANNEY MONTGOMERY SCOTT LLC, Mar. 12, 2013, at 3-4, available at
http://www.janney.com/File%20Library/Unassigned/BAB-MutualAssurance_3_2013.pdf (“Much as Burger King and McDonalds often benefit when their
fast food locations exist on the same corner, by drawing more potential customers, the
competition between BAM and Assured will energize the bond insurance proposition,
with each company participating in a growing insurance market.”).
43. See, e.g., U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, supra note 41 (reporting
that AGM represented 99.8% of municipal bond insurance market share in 2012 and
100% of the market share in both 2011 and 2010).
44. See Schankel, supra note 42, at 3.
BAM will only insure fixed rate bonds (no floating rate, put bonds, swaps
etc.). At least one public, underlying investment grade rating from one of the
rating agencies is required. The benefit of an underlying rating is the additional
third party surveillance provided by the rating agency. . . .
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reasonable to assume that bondholders currently pay a significant
premium to obtain insurance like all customers in a market dominated by
a single monopolist.45 As recently as 2007, the monoline market
consisted of six carriers.46 Many withdrew from the market during the
recent recession in response to a large volume of claims and attendant
losses.47
Monoline insurance rates are largely determined by the overall health
of the issuing municipality but are also affected by their own rated
health.48 AGM relies on rating agencies and other available data in order
In the initial few months of its participation in the insurance marketplace,
BAM has already generated a more competitive environment. . . .
Through mid March BAM insured 87 new issues totaling $559 million
compared to 105 issues adding up to $965 million for Assured. . . .
Assured Guaranty faces challenges from both an aggressive new
competitor in BAM and the recent rating downgrade from Moody’s, but retains
advantages in both its strong brand recognition and solid capital base. In round
numbers, BAM’s $500 million in capital well covers its approximately $550
million of insurance in force, but of course this nearly one to one ratio of
exposure to capital will grow as BAM writes more business.
Id.
45. For a detailed introduction to monopoly power and pricing in a non-competitive
market, see Andreas G. Papandreou, Market Structure and Monopoly Power, 39.5 AM.
ECON. REV. 883 (1949).
46. WELLS FARGO ADVANTAGE FUNDS, supra note 38. Before any monoline insurer
suffered a downgrade, there were six insurers that carried a “AAA” rating, the highest
rating possible: Ambac, CIFG, FGIC, FSA, MBIA, and XLCA. FSA was acquired and
merged into AGM and is the only remaining insurer continuing to write new business.
See GALLIARD CAPITAL MGMT., QUICK TAKES: MONOLINE INSURANCE COMPANIES 1
(Nov. 2007), available at http://www.galliard.com/_literature_66371/Monoline_
Insurance_Companies.
47. The two largest monoline insurers historically are National (formerly MBIA) and
Ambac. National continues to be solvent, but it is not writing new business pending
litigation. See Schankel, supra note 42, at 4. Ambac’s major downfall came not from
municipal bonds but guaranteeing subprime mortgage securities prior to the economic
recession of the late 2000s. See Shira Ovide, Read Ambac Financial’s Bankruptcy Filing,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 8, 2010, 5:54 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2010/11/08/read-ambacfinancials-bankruptcy-filing/.
48. See JAMES P. MCNICHOLS, CASUALTY ACTUARY FORUM, MONOLINE INSURANCE &
FINANCIAL
GUARANTY
RESERVING
231,
234-35
(2003),
available
at
http://www.casact.org/pubs/forum/03fforum/03ff231.pdf.
Financial guarantee insurance provides investors with guaranteed payment
of timely interest and ultimate principal in the event that a debt issuer is
unable to meet its financial obligations. The insurance guarantee is irrevocable
and unconditional (and waives all defenses, including fraud) and results in the
guarantor stepping into the shoes of the issuer in that it guarantees payments
ha accordance with the original transaction schedule on a timely basis. In the
event the issuer fails to pay the coupon and/or principal on a timely basis the
investor has recourse to the [financial guaranty] insurer who will pay the
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to evaluate the creditworthiness of a particular project and the financial
health of the city offering the debt.49 In Detroit, Jeff Wattrick writes that
mayors and city councils have been floating the city’s
budget with the municipal equivalent of payday
loans. . . . “The debt sales cost Detroit $474 million,
including underwriting expenses, bond-insurance
premiums and fees for wrong-way bets on swaps,
timely interest and/or ultimate principal in accordance with the terms of the
affected bond . . . . In [financial guaranty] insurance you pay the investor now
and argue with the issuer later. Absent that type of insurer performance,
(known as a “capital market” standard), investors would have no incentive to
buy “wrapped” bonds.
The established primary financial guarantors are rated AAA (or their
equivalent) by each of Standard & Poors, Moodys and Fitch and, by virtue of
the guarantee, securities they wrap inherit their AAA rating.
Such AAA ratings provide the issuer with reduced borrowing costs (as the
pricing benefits outweigh the cost of the guarantee) and better marketability of
the bonds. As a general rule, monolines target roughly 2/3rds of the available
spread as the required insurance premium. Investors benefit from enhanced
security and liquidity of the insured bonds. They also benefit from the credit
monitoring expertise of the guarantor and the comfort that the insurer is sharing
the risk by lending its credit quality to the issue.
The most important strengths of the primary monoline insurers are their
ratings. As a consequence, they work closely with the rating agencies to
preserve them. Capital adequacy and solvency obviously play a key role in the
rating agencies’ credit assessments. In addition, rating agencies require that all
potential transactions be of investment grade quality (i.e., at least BBB- or
equivalent) before any insurance wrap is considered. Therefore, each
transaction generally receives a “shadow” (non-public) rating by at least two of
the three major rating agencies and, thus, a full deal rating agency review.
Id.; see also WELLS FARGO ADVANTAGE FUNDS, supra note 38 (explaining that monolines
had to maintain AAA ratings to secure business and that anything less would effectively
shut them down because investors would not pay for the lower-rated guarantee.).
49. See NEIL O’HARA, SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKT. ASS’N (SIFMA), THE FUNDAMENTALS
OF MUNICIPAL BONDS (6th ed. 2011).
[M]onolines had to maintain their AAA ratings to secure business; investors
were looking for nothing less than AAA-rated guarantees on the debt they were
buying. What good was an AA-rated insurance provider for an AA-rated
municipal bond? It added nothing to the deal. On top of that, municipal bonds
were already on a higher credit quality scale than the corporate ratings scale,
meaning that an A-rated municipal bond had less likelihood of default than an
A-rated corporate bond, or an A-rated insurance company for that matter.
Municipals had better overall credit profiles and were put on a customized
ratings scale with a downward bias to give some context across the different
deals.
WELLS FARGO ADVANTAGE FUNDS, supra note 38, at 6; see generally McNichols, supra
48
note .
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according to data compiled by Bloomberg. That almost
equals the city’s 2013 budget for police and fire
protection.”50
In Central Falls, Moody’s Investors Service downgraded the small city’s
credit rating three times in thirteen months, going from a Baa1 rating in
May 2010, to a Caa1 rating in June 2011.51
As one would expect, cities in generally poor financial health find
that they must promise higher rates of interest in order to attract buyers
for their debt. Likewise, the cost of insuring this debt is inversely related
to a municipality’s fiscal status.52
B. Default
Since 1981, forty-four municipalities in the U.S. have filed for
bankruptcy protection. Thus far, no bankruptcy has concluded with a
requirement that bondholders take less than the full amount of the debt
owed. (In the newly filed Detroit case, numerous arguments have been
made to the effect that it is time for bondholders to share in the cost of
restructuring.53) It appears that the not-yet-concluded bankruptcy in

50. Jeff Wattrick, Detroit Doesn’t Just Have A Debt Problem, It Has A Borrowing
Addiction,
DEADLINE
DETROIT
(Mar.
14,
2013,
9:53
PM),
http://www.deadlinedetroit.com/articles/4103/detroit_doesn_t_just_have_debt_problem_i
t_has_a_borrowing_addiction#.UfyKU6K1Ftk.
30
51. MOODY’S, supra note .
52. See generally SYLVAN G. FELDSTEIN & FRANK J. FABOZZI, THE HANDBOOK OF
48
MUNICIPAL BONDS (1st ed. 2008); see also McNichols, supra note , at 257-61
(“Monoline pricing constraints . . . [are] ultimately a function of risk management (i.e.
underwriting) and capital management.”).
53. See Daniel Fisher, Detroit’s Bankruptcy Is Just Politics by Other Means, FORBES
(July
19,
2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2013/07/19/detroitsbankruptcy-is-just-politics-by-other-means/ (“Among other things, that judge will have to
tackle the politically charged question of whether the city’s public employees can jump
ahead of bondholders and other creditors to collect pension payments that vastly exceed
both financial reserves and the city’s likely ability to repay.”); see also State of Pay,
ECONOMIST
(June
22,
2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-andeconomics/21579861-what-do-woes-detroit-mean-muni-bonds-state-pay (explaining that
both Detroit, Michigan and Jefferson County, Alabama are proposing plans to emerge
from bankruptcy that involve taking creditors for losses); Yaccino & Cooper, supra note
3
(“Detroit . . . wants to spread the losses to investors as well as pensioners, and hopes to
find cheaper ways to cover retirees through the subsidized health exchanges being created
by President Obama’s health care law.”).
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Jefferson County, Alabama may become the first case in which a court
forces bondholders to accept less than the full amount of debt owed.54
Central Falls followed the more common practice of protecting
bondholder and monoline insurer interests completely. In Rhode Island,
the legislature and various observers explicitly acknowledged the need to
contain the crisis in Central Falls and to avoid a scenario in which other
Rhode Island cities were denied access to the bond market in order to
finance public projects.55 This view—that it was appropriate for the state
to ensure access for other municipalities to the bond market no matter
54. Jefferson County, which was the largest municipal bankruptcy on record until
Detroit filed on July 18, 2013, is buried in $4.2 billion in debt. JP Morgan is the county’s
largest creditor with $1.22 billion outstanding. The current plan filed with the bankruptcy
court will require JP Morgan to settle for 31% of what it is owed. Steven Church & Dawn
McCarty, Jefferson County Files to End Bankruptcy, Adjust Debt, BLOOMBERG (July 1,
2013, 3:47 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-30/jefferson-county-files-toend-bankruptcy-adjust-debt.html.
Less than $100 million of [Jefferson] county’s $4.2 billion in debt will be paid
with no changes to the terms of the original lending documents. Sewer warrant
holder JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) will collect 31 percent of what it is owed,
while some general obligation bondholders will lose the right to collect penalty
fees and a higher, default interest rate.
Id.
The same plan calls for the monoline carriers to accept $165 million in
satisfaction of $315 million owed. Id. Any bondholder with a warrant (a security option
used to enhance the yield of the bond) that is owed more than $500 million must choose
between collecting 65 cents on the dollar or 80 cents on the dollar if they forego their
34
right to make a claim with their monoline carrier. Id.; Norris, supra note . The idea is to
incentivize bondholders to relieve some of the pressure on the insurer. A hearing is
currently scheduled for November 2013 for U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Thomas Bennett to
consider whether or not to approve this plan. Melinda Dickinson & Verna Gates,
Bankrupt Alabama County Makes Another Deal Ahead of Final Plan, CHI. TRIB. (June
27,
2013),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-06-27/news/sns-rt-us-usajeffersoncounty-20130627_1_bankrupt-alabama-biggest-municipal-bankruptcy-jeffersoncounty.
55. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-12-1 (2013); see also Cate Long, This Class is
Unimpaired
by
the
Plan,
REUTERS
(Sept.
26,
2011),
http://blogs.reuters.com/muniland/2011/09/26/this-class-is-unimpaired-by-the-plan/.
In a new and surprising move the state of Rhode Island passed General
Laws § 45-12-1 and enshrined in law that bonds are secured by a Rhode Island
statutory lien on property taxes and general fund revenues. In essence the state
created a post-facto super senior preference for bondholders. The state changed
the rules after the game was underway.
The stated concern of state officials was that if Central Falls bondholders
were “haircut” in bankruptcy court then bond market access for all cities in the
state would close or be severely curtailed. In essence the state wanted to ring
fence the assets of the bondholders assets against any harm that a bankruptcy
proceeding would subject them to.
Id.
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how severe the crisis in Central Falls—guaranteed that the costs of
restructuring would fall on taxpayers (already some of the poorest
residents of the state) and current and former public employees.
For months the local press offered up real life examples of retirees
whose pension and health care benefits were reduced dramatically. For
example, the pension of former Central Falls acting fire chief, Gerard
Dion, dropped from over $75,000 annually to just over $34,000.56 The
absolute smallest reduction went to Michael Long, whose pension
dropped from $11,522 annually to $10,000, a cut of 13%.57 Because
these retirees never participated in the Social Security retirement
program58 that is mandatory for most U.S. workers, the stories were
especially poignant. Older retirees, often disabled and unlikely to be able
to reenter the workforce, simply had to make due with huge cuts to their
income and health care benefits—all in the midst of the worst recession
since the 1930s.
For those who favored absolute protection for the insured creditors,
this was painful but necessary medicine. They pointed out that many
public employees had, in effect, enjoyed years of over-compensation.
The moral hazard story at the core of this view is a familiar and, I think,
an accurate one. Short-sighted politicians, eager to please and attract
support at the polls, routinely made long-term financial commitments
with taxpayer dollars that were overly generous by any measure. Wellorganized public employee unions delivered votes in return for modest
short-term gains (i.e., increases to current salary) and substantial longterm gains (pension enhancements and expensive retiree health benefits
without so much as a co-pay or deductible). In effect, both the political
representatives and public employees decided that an optimal strategy
was to borrow from future taxpayers. In a world where incomes and tax
revenue are rising, this kind of arrangement may be sustainable at least
for a while; in a place like Central Falls, where incomes were stagnant or
falling and the tax base was eroding, such an arrangement was
56. Ted Nesi, C. Falls Slashes Dozens of Pensions by 55%; One Gets Cut $41K,
WPRI, (Sept. 2, 2011, 2:30 PM), http://blogs.wpri.com/2011/09/02/c-falls-slashesdozens-of-pensions-by-55-one-gets-cut-41k/.
57. Id.
58. The Social Security retirement program works by having employees pay into the
fund while one is working and then receive benefits later upon retirement. The program
includes retirees, as well as disability and survivor benefits. The earliest you can start
collecting Social Security retirement benefits is age 62, even if you retire before that, and
the latest is age 70. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-1397 (West 2008). If you are covered only by
your state or local pension plan, you can opt out of the Social Security program. Id. §
302; Retirement Planner: State and Local Government Employment, U.S. SOC. SECURITY
ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/retire2/stateandlocal.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2014).
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guaranteed to result in financial collapse. There was, in the end, no
magic money and no way for a poor and working class city to honor all
of the promises it made to both its employees and its other creditors.59
Bondholders must have known that the trajectory in Central Falls
was unsustainable;60 the city’s political representatives—at least those
that were focused on anything other than their own corrupt schemes for
self-advancement—also knew. Only the taxpayers, especially the nonEnglish speakers and those unfamiliar with the nature of municipal
finance in the United States who made up a majority of the residents in
Central Falls61 can credibly claim that they were surprised by the city’s
financial collapse.
Culpability for the mess in Central Falls certainly resides with the
political actors who, aided and abetted by public employees, promised
benefits far beyond what the poor town could afford;62 however, the
bondholders, emboldened by their insurers, must bear some share of the
blame for continuing to finance imprudent projects like Wyatt. The lack
of any truly innocent party (except, perhaps, for the ill-informed
taxpayer) makes the imposition of the costs of bankruptcy on all parties
save the bondholders truly remarkable.

59. See Mary Williams Walsh & Michael Cooper, Faltering Rhode Island City Tests
Vows to Pensioners, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2011, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/13/us/13bankruptcy.html.
Cities and local governments make lots of promises: to their citizens, workers,
vendors and investors. But when the money starts to run out, as it has in Central
Falls, some promises prove more binding than others. Bond lawyers have
known for decades that it is possible, at least in theory, to put bondholders
ahead of pensioners, but no one wanted to try it and risk a backlash on Election
Day.
Id.
60. Contra WELLS FARGO ADVANTAGE FUNDS, supra note 38, at 3.
Insured municipal bonds were viewed as AAA-rated quality with essentially no
need to even measure their underlying credit profiles, because all monolines
were AAA-rated companies and none had ever failed to make a payment.
Therefore, payments to investors were guaranteed, regardless of whether or not
the municipality could make them. In short, confidence was high in monolinebacked municipal bonds. As a result, many investors did little due diligence on
the credit quality or the insurance that backed the bonds.
Id.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 14-29.
62. See Williams & Goodnough, supra note 31.
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III. EVALUATING CONTAGION
The conventional answer to the question of why bondholders should
be protected above all other creditors is fear of contagion.63 If contagion
claims are real—i.e., both the distressed city and possibly others in the
same state or region will be denied access to capital and the ability to
finance routine projects—then protecting bondholders at the expense of
taxpayers and current and former employees may make sense.
Bondholders and insurers routinely (and as expected) raise the specter of
contagion
post-default
during
negotiations
with
struggling
64
municipalities. What is less clear is whether bondholders actually make
good on their threats to cut off debt-ridden cities.

63. See Chris Brune & Pu Liu, The Contagion Effect of Default Risk Insurer
Downgrades: The Impact on Insured Municipal Bonds, 63 J. ECON. & BUS. 492, 501
(2011) (“Due to a contagion effect, countless insured municipal bonds were affected,
regardless of whether they were insured by the downgraded insurer.”); see also John M.
Halstead et al., Eastern Finance Association, Orange County Bankruptcy: Financial
Contagion in the Municipal Bond and Bank Equity Markets, 39.2 FIN. REV. 293, 295
(2004) (“Current literature on financial contagion suggests that economic shocks of this
magnitude could potentially spread to other local governments not directly exposed to the
original shocks for both fundamental (rational) and irrational reasons.”); see also
31
Williams & Goodnough, supra note (“[W]hen local governments have veered toward
bankruptcy—Orange County, Calif., in 1994; Cleveland in 1978—neighboring
municipalities have found it harder to sell their own debt. During the New York City
fiscal crisis of 1975, New Jersey suddenly found its bonds harder to sell.”).
34
64. See Greenhut, supra note .
“Chapter 9 was not intended to be used as a sword to prefer one class of
similarly situated creditor over another,” said Assured Guaranty in an Aug. 1
statement. “Stockton’s attempt to transfer the cost of lucrative, above-market
employee wages and benefits granted when tax revenues were flush to capital
markets creditors by haircutting bond principal is unprecedented, a contortion
of the bankruptcy process and will foreclose Stockton’s access to the capital
markets for the foreseeable future.”
59
Id.; see also Walsh & Cooper, supra note .
Bond lawyers have known for decades that it is possible, at least in theory,
to put bondholders ahead of pensioners, but no one wanted to try it and risk a
backlash on Election Day. Now the poor, taxed-out city of Central Falls is
mounting a test case, which other struggling governments may follow if it
succeeds.
....
In Central Falls, the pension plan for the police and firefighters is projected
to run out of money in October. But officials there say short-changing the
bondholders will not bring relief. The next time the city needs to borrow
money, investors will simply demand more in interest, and they might decide
all Rhode Islanders were a bad risk and charge all cities more.
Id.
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It is important to note at the outset of any discussion about the
consequences of default that many bondholders are also retirees because
public (and private) pension plans hold so much public debt.65 Thus, the
often-discussed tension between bondholders and retirees66 is in one
sense a false one: retirees lose when bondholders lose. The problem, of
course, with this analysis is that it fails to take into account the presence
of insurance that is available only to the bondholders. As Central Falls so
clearly demonstrates, a direct cut to public pension income is almost
impossible for an older retiree to recoup. Bondholders, however, are
entitled to full payment from the monoline carrier in the event of
default.67 Likewise, public pension plans (which are overwhelmingly
defined benefit plans68) also benefit from any reduction in obligations to
retirees.
To see this more clearly, consider a seventy-year-old retiree who is
receiving a pension income of $4000 per month prior to her pension
plan’s forced restructuring in Chapter 9. If this retiree’s income came
from one of the Central Falls plans, her income would be reduced to
65. As of June 2013, state and local government debt, including pension funds,
account for $703.5 billion worth of the overall U.S. public debt. Similarly, private
pension funds account for $605 billion in public debt. Overall, fifteen percent of public
debt is held by mutual funds, private pensions, savings bonds, or treasury notes.
Kimberly Amadeo, Who Owns the U.S. National Debt?, ABOUT.COM (June 3, 2013),
http://useconomy.about.com/od/monetarypolicy/f/Who-Owns-US-National-Debt.htm.
66. See Jacob Gershman, Bondholders, Public Pensioners Square Off in Detroit,
WALL ST. J. (July 18, 2013), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2013/07/18/bondholders-publicpensioners-square-off-in-detroit/ (“The bankruptcy case in Detroit could be titled
Bondholders v. Pensioners. The city’s emergency manager has said his goal is to spread
the pain around.”); see also Abby Goodnough, City in Rhode Island Asks Retirees to
Sacrifice, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/20/us/
20centralfalls.html (“CENTRAL FALLS, R.I.—The retirees came from near and far,
gathering in a muggy auditorium here to listen to an urgent pitch: give back a big chunk
34
of your pension or risk losing it all.”); see also Greenhut, supra note (“The recent war
of words between the California Public Employees’ Retirement System and a Bermudabased bond-insurance company called Assured Guaranty Ltd. has made it clear that
California officials would rather stiff bondholders than trim even the most generous
pension benefits promised to public-sector workers.”).
67. Unless, of course, the monoline insurer collapses, which many did after the
34
subprime mortgage crisis. See Norris, supra note
(“Another risk, probably never
considered, was that the monoline insurance companies, which routinely guaranteed
munis for a fee, would collapse.”).
68. ORRIN HATCH, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON FIN., STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLANS: THE PENSION DEBT CRISIS THAT THREATENS AMERICA
(2012), available at http://www.hatch.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/ecfaf678-a3ec45a4-a2bf-3bca4fe9475d/Hatch%20Report%20-%20The%20Pension%20Debt%20Crisis
%20that%20Threatens%20America.pdf (“It has been estimated recently that aggregate
underfunding of state and local defined benefit pensions plans may exceed $4 trillion.”).
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approximately $2000 per month. Her only options for replacing the lost
income are reentry into the labor force (problematic for most seventyyear-olds), a steady drawdown on private savings (if available), or
assistance from family or friends. Even though, in the long run, her
defined benefit plan69 may in fact be healthier because its obligations to
retirees have shrunk dramatically, it is impossible to see how the
individual retiree is better off.
Now, compare the situation of the bondholder and the plan itself to
that of the retiree. In Central Falls, the bondholders’ expected stream of
income is effectively protected through increased taxes and reductions in
payments to retirees; even if the bondholder is forced to share in some of
the loss, as in Jefferson County,70 insurers will make the bondholders
whole. Finally, the municipality’s defined benefit plan’s liabilities have
been reduced. Although plan representatives may publicly bemoan
benefit cuts,71 it cannot be denied that the plan itself is in far better
financial shape following a 50% reduction in its liabilities.
69. A defined benefit plan (DB Plan) is a retirement account for which an employer
promises a set amount of money upon retirement, usually based on salary and length of
employment. This is in contrast to a defined contribution (DC) plan, like a 401(k), in
which an employee invests his own money for retirement. The key distinction is that a
plan sponsor bears the risk with a DB plan and a participant bears the risk with a DC
plan. For a vast amount of information on defined benefit and defined contribution plans,
see Joseph Comprix & Karl A. Muller III, Pension Plan Accounting Estimates and the
Freezing of Defined Benefit Pension Plans, 51 J. ACCT. & ECON. 115, 117 (2011)
(“Defined contribution plans require employers to make specified contributions towards
employees’ retirement plans. Investment risk then falls upon the employee, with the
employer having no further pension obligation after the contribution has been made. In
contrast, defined benefit plans represent a formal promise that the employer will pay predetermined benefits upon retirement.”); see also James Poterba et al., Defined
Contribution Plans, Defined Benefit Plans, and the Accumulation of Retirement Wealth,
91 J. PUB. ECON. 2062 (2007) (“Wealth accumulation in DC plans depends on a
participant’s contribution behavior and on financial market returns, while accumulation
in DB plans is sensitive to a participant’s labor market experience and to plan
parameters.”); see also Jonathon Barry Forman, Public Pensions: Choosing Between
Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Plans, 1999 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C. L.
187 (Spring 1999); see also Tomas Dvorak, Timing of Retirement Plan Contributions and
Investment Returns: The Case of Defined Benefit Versus Defined Contribution, 12 B. E. J.
ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y (2012); see also Ultimate Guide to Retirement, CNN MONEY,
http://money.cnn.com/retirement/guide/pensions_basics.moneymag/index.htm?iid=EL
(last visited Feb. 2, 2014).
70. The proposed plan in Jefferson County has bondholders sharing the loss with
retirees. The plan will be reviewed for final order in November 2013. See Steven Church,
Jefferson County to Turn Deal into Bankruptcy Plan, BLOOMBERG (June 5, 2013, 2:27
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-05/jefferson-county-to-turn-deal-intobankruptcy-plan.html.
71. For an example of trustees complaining about reductions to retirees, see Sona
Mkrttchian, Central Falls on Track to Emerge from Bankruptcy, BROWN DAILY HERALD
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The sense of abandonment and isolation that Central Falls retirees
expressed72 as the city prepared to emerge from Chapter 9 was
objectively reasonable. The burden of correcting the city’s finances fell
solely on the shoulders of retirees and taxpayers—the status of
bondholders, insurers, and even the city’s defined benefit plans73 was
unaffected or improved following bankruptcy.

(Sept. 20, 2012), http://www.browndailyherald.com/2012/09/20/central-falls-on-track-toemerge-from-bankruptcy/ (reporting a dialogue with the president of the Central Falls
Police Retirees Association); see also Union Leader says Central Falls Firefighters are
Among Lowest Paid in Rhode Island, PROVIDENCE J. POLITIFACT (Aug. 28, 2011),
http://www.politifact.com/rhode-island/statements/2011/aug/28/joseph-andriole/unionleader-says-central-falls-firefighters-are-a/.
72. For examples of Central Falls retirees expressing themselves over lost pensions,
see Hilary Russ, Bankruptcy Saves Tiny Rhode Island City, but Leaves Scars, REUTERS
(Sept. 3, 2012, 8:06 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/04/us-usa-rhodeislandcentralfalls-bankrupt-idUSBRE88300220120904.
“We’ve been pilfered and beaten down,” said Bruce Ogni, president of the
Central Falls police retirees organization. “We didn’t have the power, the
money, to fight it.”
....
[Thomas] Cawley was a Central Falls police officer for 26 years, retiring as
a sergeant in 1986, the same year Rolling Stone magazine labeled the city the
biggest cocaine hub in the Northeast.
At his dining room table, Cawley gazes through thick glasses at a pile of
letters. One, from September 2011, informed him that after making payments
for a $20,000 life insurance policy for 24 years, his policy had been canceled as
part of the city’s austerity plan.
Cawley’s annual pension payment was slashed to $18,274 from $27,073
and his health insurance was moved to Medicare from Blue Cross at a cost to
him of $100 a month.
He, like other Central Falls employees, gets no Social Security benefits
from his city job, though he receives about $6,000 a year in Social Security
payments from old part-time jobs.
He and his wife are angry, but the retirees didn’t have the money or power
to fight it, they said. “We have to live on what we’re getting,” he said. “What
else can you do?”
Id.
73. See Williams & Goodnough, supra note 31 (“Mike Andrews, president of the
local firefighters’ union, said about one in four of his men now qualified for retirement,
but were afraid to retire, concerned that their pensions would be chopped in
bankruptcy.”). For a similar example, see Monica Davey & Mary Williams Walsh,
Chicago Sees Pension Crisis Drawing Near, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/06/us/chicago-sees-pension-crisis-drawing-near.html
(“Illinois lawmakers, who make key financing and benefit choices for Chicago’s pension
system, have wrestled for months without agreement on the politically troublesome
matter of cutting the benefits of public sector retirees to save money.”).
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A. The Lessons of Harrisburg
The bankruptcy of the impoverished city of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania
is sometimes cited as a cautionary tale about the consequences of
ignoring contagion. In 2003, Harrisburg’s city trash incinerator was shut
down by the federal government due to toxic air pollution.74 In a
unanimous vote, Harrisburg City Council voted to approve a rebuild and
expansion that would ultimately cost the city $345 million and force
them into default.75 Constant delays, setbacks, and cost overruns turned
what was supposed to be a moneymaker into a major liability for city
finances.
In January 2013, the Wall Street Journal reported that Harrisburg
was in default on its bonds and was “effectively shut out of the
municipal-debt market.”76 City officials were described as going door-todoor in search of lenders, none of whom wanted to risk loaning money
when the city might seek protection under Chapter 9 at any moment.77 In
June 2011, the Pennsylvania state legislature passed a law preventing
third-class municipalities from filing for Chapter 9 through July 1,
2012.78 As a result, Judge Mary France had no real choice other than to
reject Harrisburg’s bankruptcy as an illegal filing.79 In Harrisburg,
lenders withdrew even in the absence of a bankruptcy filing.
32

74. Cooper, supra note .
75. Mary Williams Walsh & Jon Hurdle, Harrisburg Sees Path to Restructuring
Debts
Without
Bankruptcy
Filing,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
25,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/25/us/harrisburg-sees-path-to-restructuring-debtswithout-bankruptcy-filing.html.
76. Michael Corkery, Bottom Falls Out of Debt-Ridden City, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 31,
2013), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142412788732392610457827604413294769
4.html.
77. A similar scenario is playing out at the state level in Illinois where bondholders
are demanding extraordinarily high interest rates in order to loan money. For example,
Illinois was expected to sell $1.3 billion in bonds in late June 2013 to improve highways,
rebuild a train line, and acquire land for an airport. Brian Battle, the director of
Performance Trust Capital Partners in Chicago, estimated that the state “will pay more
than $18 million in extra interest each year than states such as Virginia or Maryland
which have high credit ratings.” Sara Burnett, Illinois’ Bad Credit Costing Taxpayers
Millions, YAHOO! NEWS (June 25, 2013, 3:23 AM), http://news.yahoo.com/illinois-badcredit-costing-taxpayers-millions-071545200.html (emphasis added) (noting that Illinois
has now replaced California as the state with the lowest credit rating in the country).
78. 2011
Pa.
Laws
318,
No.
79,
available
at
http://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/LI/US/HTM/2011/0/0079..HTM.
79. Harrisburg may have found another way out of debt. Harrisburg, PA, Close to
Deal
on
Debt-laden
Incinerator
Sale,
REUTERS
(July
24,
2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/24/usa-harrisburg-incineratoridUSL1N0FU0OF20130724 (reporting that Harrisburg said they have reached an
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Is there evidence of contagion when a city goes bankrupt—the
spread of risk from one city to another? The answer is mixed.
Immediately after a default, there is evidence of bondholders demanding
increased rates of return in nearby jurisdictions. In a 2005 study of local
responses to municipal bankruptcies, Stowe and Maloney concluded that
“closely matching jurisdictions also pay a risk premium, though one not
quite as large. . . . While one might be tempted to call this a contagion
effect, it is more likely indicative of an initial period of economic
uncertainty.”80 This fear of increased borrowing costs for nearby
agreement to sell the trash incinerator to Lancaster County Solid Waste Management, and
although the price was not finalized, they hoped to get $130 million).
80. KRISTIN STOWE & M.T. MALONEY, CLEMSON UNIV., THE RESPONSE OF THE DEBT
MARKET
TO
MUNICIPAL
FINANCIAL
DISTRESS
(2005),
available
at
http://myweb.clemson.edu/~maloney/papers/muni-financial-distress.pdf.
This study adds to our understanding of the impact of municipal bond
default and bankruptcy. Municipalities that go through a financial crisis pay
risk premiums higher than a control group of municipalities both before and
after their default. Risk premiums rise before a crisis occurs for a subset of the
defaulters and fall modestly afterwards for most.
We measure this risk premium in a novel way. We construct a yield
premium by taking the difference between the reoffering yield on newly issued
municipal bonds and the maturity matched average yield on AAA-rated
municipal debt. However, because the structure of debt changes before and
after default, and is different for defaulters compared to the control group, the
raw yield premium is not indicative of the true cost of borrowing. Defaulters
are paying for the structure of their debt, and the cost of their borrowing is best
seen in the interest rate that they would be charged if they issued “naked”
bonds, that is, bonds with no credit validation. To account for this, we estimate
a yield premium regression holding constant the structure of debt, the distance
in time from the default, and controlling for the selection effect, that is,
controlling for the ways that defaulters systematically differ from the average
municipality. The true cost associated with default is then measured by the
intercept, the time effect, and the selection coefficient.
We find that the risk premium paid by defaulters prior to default is
substantial. Special districts paid over 8 percentage points higher interest,
including the selection and time effects. This is, if the average special district
had tried to issue debt without any credit validation in the month prior to its
financial crisis, the reoffering yield would have been 820 basis points higher
than the Aaa-rated municipal interest rate. The risk premium for cities and
counties excluding Orange County is estimated to be 552 basis points. For the
special districts, we see a run up in the risk premium indicating that the
deteriorating financial condition was apparent, on average, to the bond market.
However, default for cities and counties in our sample, including and excluding
Orange, seems to have come as a shock in that there is no run up.
Following default, jurisdictions that reenter the bond market face a risk
premium of around 400 basis points. It is not that the risk premium declines
following default, but rather that only the most credit-worthy jurisdictions are
able to reenter the debt market. Again, this is the excess reoffering yield that
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communities might be especially concerning for a small state like Rhode
Island in which every city is relatively near every other.
Others have suggested that the municipal bond market is just too
inefficient and slow to be affected by contagion no matter what the
circumstances. Tracy Gordon81 has argued that because municipal bonds
have a “traditional mom-and-pop structure” and few transactions, many
buyers pay different prices for the same bond. The market is also
characterized by relatively low levels of disclosure, which means that
shocks to the system (e.g., a bankruptcy filing) take time to trickle down.
Gordon argues that during this slow process, “educated institutional
investors are probably able to sort good apples from bad” while other
investors “simply buy and hold.” If this is true (and Gordon points to the
run toward U.S. treasury bonds following the 2008 financial crisis to
support his claim), then it may be that nearby jurisdictions actually
benefit when a neighbor defaults and enters Chapter 9.
A December 2011 International Monetary Fund working paper
suggested that the market for municipal bonds is “not prone to contagion
but rather to flight to quality.”82 This means that in the event of default,
they would be forced to pay if they issued debt without any credit validation.
Even though they almost always issue debt with credit validation, we expect
that they are paying a price for this service which is approximately equal to
what it is worth in reduced interest charges. There is statistically weak evidence
that the risk premium declines over time. Descriptive analysis of post-default
borrowers indicates that they are a mixed bag. Some jurisdictions recover
naturally, some undergo managerial reorganization, some issue debt only for
the purpose of settling the default. Because of this, it is not surprising that the
time effect following default is measured imprecisely.
Finally, we estimated the risk premium for a sample of jurisdictions that
closely match the defaulters in terms of location, size, and purpose. From this
sample we get a sense of the degree of inherent risk faced by the defaulters.
The closely matching jurisdictions also pay a risk premium, though one not
quite as large as their neighbors. In the period before default, neighbors of the
defaulters paid a risk premium of around 300 basis points but, as we might
expect, there was no run-up in their borrowing cost. After the neighboring
financial collapse, the closely matched group also experiences a drop in risk
premium, and one that does go down with time. While one might be tempted to
call this a contagion effect, it is more likely indicative of an initial period of
economic uncertainty in the region and then long term growth in the tax base at
least for those jurisdictions that entered the debt market following the
neighbor’s default.
Id.
81. Gordon, supra note 9.
9
82. Arezki, supra note , at 7-10.
Overall, the results indicate that during a period of volatility, investors seek
“safer” municipal investments—a sort of “flight to safety” that occurs during
financial crises when investors (domestic and international) become less
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creditors move their money to nearby, more stable municipalities and not
out of the market entirely.
B. Can Bondholders (and Insurers) Distinguish Between the Healthy and
the Sick?
Gordon’s work and the IMF study findings are consistent with recent
claims made by Clayton Gillette,83 who has noted that “contagion should
not occur because investors will distinguish financially healthy
jurisdictions from distressed ones.”84 Gillette argued that because the
market for municipal securities functions with a relatively low level of
disclosure, it lacks the ability to perfectly segment a jurisdiction in
default from other nearby cities.85 In other words, a lack of information
creates a situation in which investors view the default of a city as a signal
of new (and unfavorable) information about general municipal financial
stability.
It would appear that in Central Falls the legislature felt obligated to
do exactly what Gillette suggested they would—“forestall municipal
defaults in order to avoid perceptions of more general fiscal fragility.”86
When the default could no longer be avoided and bankruptcy was the
only viable option, the legislature, still focused on appearances and
perceptions, rushed to protect bondholders.

concerned about yield and more concerned about the safety of their funds and
buy U.S. Treasury securities, long considered one of the world’s safest
investments. In other words, an increase in borrowing costs in one U.S. state
results in better borrowing conditions for other states. We find that other states
benefit through lower borrowing costs (bond yields) when a few of the largest
municipal issuers—such as the states of California (the largest of all), Georgia,
and Maryland and the City of New York—experience problems (in other
words, the spillover is negative).
....
This study suggests that [the] markets for individual U.S. state bonds are
prone not to contagion but rather to flight to quality, which implies that the
problems in one state did not make matters worse for other states and thus did
not increase systemic risk.
Id.
83. See Gillette, supra note 9, at 303 (“Contagion is a consequence of a perception
that one municipality’s default would generate external effects, not of the fact that those
effects would necessarily materialize. Those perceptions are likely to be promoted by
representatives of the distressed locality in their efforts to procure some form of
bailout.”).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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Central Falls was not alone in this approach. It appears to be fairly
common for state governments to scramble to avoid a municipal
bankruptcy.87 In Jefferson County, Alabama, for example, the governor
of the state made serious efforts to avoid bankruptcy after experts
advised him that “a Chapter 9 filing by the state’s most populous county
would spook the municipal bond market.”88 State governments appear to
be worried about the perception of contagion (as opposed to actual
contagion). Actual contagion requires proof of negative effects in
otherwise financially healthy nearby cities, and there is little evidence of
this.
There is evidence, however, of hasty state efforts to combat the
impression of spreading financial gloom. As Lauren Wolfe has noted,89
long-term contagion is more likely to come from not filing for Chapter 9
than from pursuing it. When Chapter 9 is unavailable, a municipality is
forced to cut services in order to repay debtors. As in Central Falls, this
creates a domino-like effect when lack of funding for police, fire, library,
hospital, prison, and sanitation services results in higher crime as well as
overcrowded prisons and hospitals. This, in turn, can cause a spillover
effect on neighboring cities and towns that may be much more difficult
to overcome than a temporary decrease in credit rating.90
87. See 2011 Pa. Laws 318, No. 79 (preventing Harrisburg from filing for Chapter 9
for one year); see also Monica Davey, Bankruptcy Lawyer is Named to Manage an Ailing
Detroit, N.Y. TIMES (March 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/15/us/gov-ricksnyder-kevyn-orr-emergency-manager-detroit.html (reporting that Michigan officials
appointed Kevyn Orr as an emergency manager with a goal of avoiding bankruptcy in
Detroit); see also David White, Alabama Governor Robert Bentley Pledges to Help
Jefferson County Avoid Bankruptcy, BIRMINGHAM NEWS (June 29, 2011, 8:30 AM),
http://blog.al.com/spotnews/2011/06/alabama_governor_robert_bentle_1.html (reporting
that Alabama Gov. Robert Bentley pledged to do “everything possible” to help Jefferson
County avoid bankruptcy).
88. Mary Williams Walsh & Campbell Robertson, Just Before Deadline, County in
Alabama
Delays
Bankruptcy
Move,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
29,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/29/business/economy/alabamas-jefferson-countypostpones-a-decision-on-bankruptcy.html.
89. Lauren M. Wolfe, The Next Financial Hurricane? Rethinking Municipal
Bankruptcy in Louisiana, 72 LA. L. REV. 555, 588-89 (2012).
Although a municipal bankruptcy may have a contagion effect on its
neighbors and the State by temporarily downgrading their bond credit ratings,
there may be long-term contagion effects that result from not allowing the
municipality to pursue Chapter 9.
....
. . . Municipal bankruptcy should not be embraced as a panacea, but it should
remain available as an option of last resort.
Id.
90. Id. at 88 (“Neighboring towns will feel the consequences . . . . Furthermore, these
effects may be felt much longer than the temporary decrease in the municipality’s credit
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The problem is that even with a Chapter 9 filing, a city may still have
to make drastic cuts, especially when the state has moved to insulate one
class of creditors—bondholders—from absorbing any losses. Conditions
were so extreme in Central Falls that some degree of loss was inevitable
for taxpayers and retirees. However, the cutbacks to city services and
pensions could have been ameliorated had the bondholders been forced
to contribute too. Given the mixed empirical and theoretical support for
contagion, the Rhode Island legislature’s efforts to protect bondholders
seem overly generous and unnecessary.
IV. IS CENTRAL FALLS A MODEL FOR OTHER STRUGGLING
MUNICIPALITIES?
Judge Frank J. Bailey of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Rhode Island
said of Central Falls, “It’s record time and record efficiency . . . . In a
way, I think this is an example—for not only Rhode Island, but maybe
the nation—on how to run a Chapter 9.”91 After the calamitous losses
suffered by taxpayers and retirees in Central Falls, the question is should
Rhode Island be viewed as a shining example of efficiency or a
cautionary tale? All indications are that municipal bankruptcy is on the
rise. Central Falls was managed corruptly and with astonishing
mendacity for years. But many other cities have received poor service
from their elected officials, over-paid for services, and made stupid
Wyatt-like investments too.92

rating. In the long run, it will benefit the State and its political subdivisions to afford a
financially distressed municipality access to Chapter 9.”).
2
91. Bidgood, supra note (quoting Judge Frank J. Bailey).
92. See CHARLIE LEDUFF, DETROIT: AN AMERICAN AUTOPSY 80-81 (2013).
[T]here is the thought that Detroit was simply a boomtown that went bust, a
city that began to fall apart the minute Henry Ford began to build it. The car
made Detroit and the car unmade Detroit. Detroit was built in some ways to be
disposable. The auto industry allowed for sprawl. It allowed a man to escape
the smoldering city with its grubby factory and steaming smokestacks.
Detroit actually began its decline in population during the 1950s, precisely
the time that Detroit—and the United States—was at its peak. And while
Detroit led the nation in per capita income and home ownership, automation
and the beginnings of a foreign competition were forcing the automobile
companies like Packard to shutter their doors. That factory closed in 1956 and
was left to rot, pulling down the east side, which pulled down the city.
By 1958, 20 percent of the Detroit workforce was jobless. Not to worry, the
city, rich with manufacturing revenue, had its own welfare system—a decade
before Johnson’s Great Society. The city provided health care, fuel, and rent
and gave $10 every week to adults for food; $5 to children. Word of the free
milk and honey made its way down South and the poor “Negros” and
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The Central Falls story is one in which “every stakeholder except the
bondholders . . . [was] suffering.”93 The only way that such a result
makes sense is if fear of contagion is so real (as it may be in Harrisburg,
for example) that asking bondholders to absorb a loss is just too
dangerous. Concrete evidence of contagion is mixed; indeed, in Rhode
Island there is little to suggest that the market would have been incapable
of distinguishing between fundamentally healthier cities and places like
Central Falls.

“Hillbillies” flooded in by train. If it wasn’t for them, the city’s population
would have sunk further than it did.
Id.; see also Charlie LeDuff, Detroit’s Bankruptcy and What it Means for America,
DALLAS NEWS
(July
29,
2013),
http://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/latestcolumns/20130728-charlie-leduff-detroits-bankruptcy-and-what-it-means-foramerica.ece.
[I]t was just 99 years ago that Henry Ford offered the workingman $5 a day and
profit-sharing. How, in less than a century, did it come to this?
The short answers: municipal mismanagement, race riots, white flight,
black flight. Overreaching unions and management that couldn’t balance a ball.
Proof? The multibillion-dollar bailout of the auto industry. Thank you,
American taxpayers!
Then there is our spectacular civic corruption: A former mayor, Kwame M.
Kilpatrick, waits for a bed in federal prison, convicted of extortion,
racketeering and bribery. He looted the city of millions of dollars and stole the
future of thousands of children.
So Detroit files for bankruptcy. What does this mean? Pay close attention
because it may be coming to you soon, Los Angeles, Baltimore, Chicago,
Philadelphia. In 2011, Moody’s calculated the unfunded liabilities for Illinois’
three largest state-run pension plans to be $133 billion. (It is expected to be
even larger this year.) That’s the size of six Detroit bankruptcies—give or take
a few hundred million.
Of Detroit’s debt of at least $18 billion, about $7 billion is secured by
collateral like casino revenues and utility taxes. That means creditors—big
banks—will get paid. Of the remaining $11 billion or so in unsecured debt,
about $9 billion is owed to retirees and current municipal workers, people like
firefighters and police officers. These debts come in the form of promised
pension checks and health care benefits, all backed by a false, unsecured
promise. These are the people who are likely to lose out.
Id.
93. Michael Conner, Alabama County Files Exit Plan to End $4.2 Billion Bankruptcy,
REUTERS
(June
30,
2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/30/us-usajeffersoncounty-idUSBRE95T0G020130630. See also Jess Bigood, Plan to End
Bankruptcy in Rhode Island City Close to Approval, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2012, at A21,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/07/us/central-falls-ri-to-emerge-frombankruptcy.html. Theodore Orson, the lawyer for Central Fall’s receiver noted that in
spite of the heavy burden on taxpayers and retirees, “we’re taking a city that was
completely dysfunctional and making it fully functional.” Id.
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A. Structural Change
One of the painful lessons of Central Falls (and, I suspect, of Detroit
a few years hence) is the widespread and fundamental lack of respect for
taxpayer dollars demonstrated by so many actors. Politicians are well
known for their cavalier attitude toward “other people’s money.”94
Central Falls illustrates that bondholders too (emboldened no doubt by
monoline protection and state officials persuaded of the need to avoid
contagion) are willing to lend money for frivolous projects unlikely to
benefit the taxpayer.95 Stripped of insurance protection and the contagion
94. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public
Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 286 (1988) (“The free
rider problem means that social and economic difficulties will not always stimulate group
formation, especially for large, diffuse groups like consumers and taxpayers, and that (in
contrast) small, elite groups might more easily organize.”); see also Kelley L. Ross, RentSeeking,
Public
Choice,
and
the
Prisoner’s
Dilemma,
FRIESIAN,
http://www.friesian.com/rent.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2014).
Public Choice theory is about the different incentives and processes that
operate when goods are sought through political means rather than through
purely economic means. The essential point is about the distribution of costs
and benefits. The political appropriation and distribution of goods is attractive
because it concentrates its benefits and disperses its costs. Many people can be
taxed only a small amount and then a small number of people can be given
large sums. This means that the many hardly notice the wealth that they have
lost, while the few become active partisans of their own benefits. Politicians
hear nothing from the many and a lot from the few, who also have some money
to contribute to the politicians, money that may actually be, or be freed up by,
the benefits they receive—like the money teachers’ unions get from
compulsory union dues, from the money paid by the government to teachers.
Thus, constituencies and interest groups are created for each particular political
benefit program, and it becomes nearly impossible to get rid of them. The rentseeking aspect of this is that the beneficiaries receive rents on the basis of their
participation in the interest group. They benefit because of who they are, not
because of what they do or what they own in a more conventional sense.
Individually, these political rents are not damaging to the whole—in the
2012 election we just heard about how little “Big Bird” costs individual
taxpayers, who are forced to support the Public Broadcasting System, which is
actually used as a front for the Democratic Party—but each group of people
which sees another obtain benefits then seeks to create some program for itself.
Such things are hard for politicians to resist, since it holds the promise of a
group of dedicated voters beholden for their own program.
Id.
32
95. See Cooper, supra note (reporting that Harrisburg, Pennsylvania filed Chapter
32
9 largely due to a failed trash incinerator project); see also Dickinson, supra note
(reporting that Jefferson County, Alabama filed Chapter 9 almost entirely due to a failed
16
sewer system project); see also Norcross, supra note (investigating Central Falls, Road
Island and its use of Wyatt Detention Center as economic development).
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threat, it is hard to believe any rational lender would have loaned
millions to Central Falls over and over again. The sad truth is that
bondholders, like elected officials, happily risked taxpayer funds for their
own personal gain.96
The guilty role played by public employees and their representatives
is by now so well understood that it requires little further explanation.97
Suffice it to say that the public employee/legislator relationship was
beneficial to all concerned save the current and future taxpayer.98
Can the elected official/lender/public employee axis be broken? The
only way forward appears to be some combination of structural changes
and increased transparency. A variety of proposals have been advanced
in recent years;99 terminating public defined benefit plans and moving
96. For example, after default in Jefferson County, four out of the five people on the
county commission have since been convicted of taking bribes and sentenced to prison.
The fifth was convicted of obstructing justice. Furthermore, the litigation surrounding the
upgraded sewer system brought about bribery and fraud charges that led to twenty-two
34
convictions. See Norris, supra note ; see also Conner, supra note 93. For another
25
example, see Niedowski, supra note
(reporting that resigned Central Falls mayor,
Charles Moreau, was sentenced to two years in prison on corruption charges).
94
97. See, e.g., Ross, supra note .
[C]onstituencies and interest groups are created for each particular political
benefit program, and it becomes nearly impossible to get rid of them . . . . They
benefit because of who they are, not because of what they do or what they own
in a more conventional sense.
....
. . . [E]ach group of people which sees another obtain benefits then seeks to
create some program for itself. Such things are hard for politicians to resist,
since it holds the promise of a group of dedicated voters beholden for their own
program.
Id.
98. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-12-1 (2013) (giving bondholders first lien during a
municipal default); see also 2011 Pa. Laws 318, No. 79 (preventing Harrisburg from
filing for Chapter 9).
99. See Mike Cherney, Providence, R.I., Readies First Bond Sale Since Pension
Reform, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 15, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20130215712502.html (reporting pension reform passed by Rhode Island that suspended COLA for
ten years, changed pension calculations and modified retiree health care); see also Lynn
Hume, Hatch Offers Pension Reform Bill; Experts Say It Wouldn’t Work, BOND BUYER
(July 9, 2013, 4:27 PM), http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/122_131/hatch-to-unveilpension-bill-tuesday-afternoon-1053518-1.html (reporting proposed legislation reform
introduced by Senator Orrin Hatch that would allow state and local governments to invest
in annuity contracts with private life insurance companies for employee retirement
benefits); Collin Levy, No Pension Reform, No Pay, WALL ST. J. (July 10, 2013, 2:08
PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323740804578597683905687760
.html (reporting a more traditional approach in which Illinois lawmakers are attempting
to impose a progressive income tax rather than the state’s current flat tax to stave off
increasing pension debt).
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employees to defined contribution arrangements similar to the private
sector’s 401(k) vehicle is among the most promising.100 Modest reforms
include requiring public plans to use realistic, market-based rates of
return when making assumptions about asset growth that directly impact
the size of future liabilities.101
More radical, but perhaps not unreasonable in extreme situations
such as Central Falls or Detroit,102 is the call to simply bar legislators
from negotiating with public unions about pensions and/or retiree health
benefits.103 The tragic mess in Central Falls—by no means isolated—
100. The main benefit for a defined contribution plan is that one is in control of one’s
money. Investment options, how much to save, etc., are all up to the contributor.
Similarly, when you leave your place of employment, the funds come with you.
However, the negatives are a consequence of the benefits. If one invests his or her money
poorly or too conservatively, a defined contribution plan may not grow fast enough to
keep up with inflation. Because retirement benefits in a defined contribution plan are not
guaranteed, this could result is a real financial problem for some retirees. See Diane
Stevens, Defined Benefit vs. Defined Contribution Pension Plans, ZACKS INVESTMENT
RES.,
http://finance.zacks.com/defined-benefit-vs-defined-contribution-pension-plans2770.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2014).
101. In the past, pension funds typically relied on expected strong investment returns
to allow reduction in the amount of money put into funds up front. More recently, some
states like Illinois have enacted a reform based on reducing the estimated rates of return
to reasonably expectable levels. However, see Matthew Glans, Illinois’ Pension Rate of
Return Changes Don’t Go Far Enough, HEARTLAND INST. (Oct. 4, 2012),
http://blog.heartland.org/2012/10/illinois-pension-rate-of-return-changes-dont-go-farenough; see also Lynne Marek, State Teachers Pension Board Lowers Expected Rate of
Return,
CRAIN’S
CHI.
BUS.
(Sept.
21,
2012,
3:20
PM),
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20120921/NEWS02/120929946/state-teacherspension-board-lowers-expected-rate-of-return (explaining that although reducing the
expected rate of return can give the appearance of increasing pension liability, it is
actually a vehicle for insuring that a municipality retains enough funding to adequately
cover its pension liability at any given time).
102. Detroit is currently in a major battle with unions who claim that the city is not
insolvent and more than capable of funding 96% of the pension. See Nancy Kaffer et al.,
Detroit: How the Motor City Went Bust, USA TODAY (July 19, 2013),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/07/18/detroit-files-forbankruptcy/2567159/; see also Chad Livengood, Orr: Police, Fire Unions May Regret
Claiming Pensions are 96% Funded, DETROIT NEWS (July 27, 2013),
http://www.detroitnews.com/article/20130727/METRO01/307270020. For a historical
background of Detroit’s union dealings, see Mike Smith, “Let’s Make Detroit a Union
Town”: The History of Labor and the Working Class in the Motor City, 27.2 MICH. HIST.
REV. 157 (Fall 2001).
103. Chris Edwards of the Cato Institute has argued, for example, that collective
bargaining by public employees “should be outlawed.” Chris Edwards, Public Sector
Unions, TAX AND BUDGET BULL. (Cato Institute, Washington D.C.), Mar. 2010, available
at http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/tbb_61.pdf. Wisconsin was the first
state to permit public sector collective bargaining in 1959. Wisconsin again made history
in 2011 with perhaps the most interesting real life battle over this issue when Republican
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would seem to demand an equally drastic response in order to avoid
recurrence. I doubt that taxpayers will muster the political will to limit
the subjects of public sector bargaining in places like Rhode Island or
Michigan. Even though they were clearly a part of the problem, the
public unions in Central Falls successfully characterized the entire
episode leading up to the bankruptcy filing as the fault of both local and
state government actors.104 While true up to a point, this position fails to
accept public employees’ own role in cannibalizing the city.105
B. Transparency
Alone or in addition to structural changes, increased transparency
(designed to inform and rouse the taxpayer) may offer another avenue for
pushing back against the strong tendency of lenders and others to “play”

Governor Scott Walker proposed dramatically reducing the ability of that state’s public
unions to negotiate to just base wages. Known as Wisconsin Act 10, bargaining over
health care, working hours, or vacations was prohibited. After plenty of theatrics,
Governor Walker prevailed. The governors of Ohio and Indiana have expressed support
for a ban or, at minimum, severe restrictions on public sector bargaining. See generally
Monica Davey & Steven Greenhouse, Wisconsin May Take an Ax to State Workers’
Benefits
and
Their
Unions,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
12,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/12/us/12unions.html?_r=0; Steven Greenhouse, A
Watershed Moment for Public Sector Unions, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/19/us/19union.html. Of course, some states, for
example, Texas, have never allowed public unions the right to bargain with the state.
104. In Central Falls, the teachers union successfully characterized the city’s problems
as a failure of state and local government that they gained the public support of President
Obama. Obama made a statement that ultimately led to Central Falls High School
rehiring everyone after the unions failed to make concessions. See Eric Tucker, Central
Falls High School Will Rehire Everybody After Firing All Teachers, HUFFINGTON POST
(May 16, 2010, 11:42 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/16/central-fallshigh-school_n_578085.html. Police and firefighter unions refused to make concessions to
their pension plan as well, ultimately being the straw that caused Central Falls to file for
Chapter 9. Only two of the city’s 141 retirees voted for reducing benefits. See Michael
McDonald et al., Central Falls Bankruptcy Casts Shadow Over Rhode Island Pensions,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 2, 2011, 11:50 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-0802/central-falls-bankruptcy-driven-by-pensions-casts-shadow-over-rhode-island.html; see
also Bob Ruplenas, Weymouth The Jaundiced Eye: Lobster, Nuclear Waste and Central
Falls,
R.I.,
WEYMOUTH
NEWS
(Aug.
29,
2011),
http://www.wickedlocal.com/weymouth/newsnow/x1688627811/Weymouth-Thejaundiced-eye-Lobster-nuclear-waste-and-Central-Falls-R-I (“The town’s union refused
to make any concessions, so Central Falls went belly-up. It won’t be the last town to do
so.”); see also Bankrupt City, WATERTOWN DAILY TIMES (Aug. 19, 2011),
http://www.watertowndailytimes.com/article/20110819/OPINION01/708199994.
94
105. See, e.g., Ross, supra note .
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with public dollars.106 Regular reporting of debt levels, credit ratings, and
relative tax burdens, available in a format comprehensible to the average
citizen, ought to lead over time to better informed (and more skeptical)
citizens. Every future promise for public pension or retiree health
coverage should come with an accurate and explicit price tag to mitigate
the tendency to promise now and worry about paying later.107
Without some combination of structural changes and improved
transparency in the public sector, it is not unreasonable to assume that
the Central Falls scenario will occur again and again.
The hard truth of Central Falls is that it was appropriate for current
and former employees and taxpayers to bear some degree of pain. All
were complicit to some degree in the city’s mismanagement. Taxpayers
must learn or be forced to pay attention and insist on accountability from
the political class. Once bankruptcy is a reality, though, there do not
appear to be good reasons for sparing the quick-to-lend bondholders.
106. There has been a call for reform under a financial accounting standard known as
GASB 45, which requires entities to recognize the cost of post-employment benefits
other than pensions over the course of an employee’s career rather than at retirement. See
Rebecca A. Sielman et al., GASB 45: A Wake-Up Call for Public Plan Sponsors,
MILLIMAN (Nov. 1, 2009), http://insight.milliman.com/article.php?cntid=6112.
[T]he intent of GASB 45 is to get employers thinking about the size of their
OPEB [other-than-pension postemployment benefits] liability—and what can
be done to manage it. The most significant OPEB is retiree medical benefits. In
creating the disclosure requirements, GASB wanted to address a growing
concern over the potential magnitude of employer obligations. With an aging
population and escalating medical costs, the old “pay-as-you-go” approach will
leave taxpayers across the country on the hook for astronomical benefits costs.
Id.; see also OEBB Members – GASB 45 Group Project FAQ, STATE OF OR. (2012),
http://www.oregon.gov/oha/OEBB/docs/GASB/2012_13/OEBBmemberQA2012.pdf. For
13
a detailed discussion on GASB 45, see generally Hylton, supra note , at 423-36.
107. See Special Report, Sinkhole! How Public Pension Promises are Draining State
and City Budgets, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK MAG. (June 12, 2005),
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2005-06-12/sinkhole.
One major category of cost isn’t disclosed at all: how much retiree health care
has been promised to public retirees. No one can estimate how much these
promises will add up to, but they’re sure to be in the tens of billions, and only
some states seem to have put aside reserves for them, according to bond
analysts. That’s chilling, given how quickly medical costs are rising. After a
pitched battle, the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB), the
independent accounting standards-setter for state and local governments, has
finally begun to require states to disclose these liabilities. Numerous unions and
state government representatives objected to the change, says GASB member
Cynthia B. Green, “not because [unions and states] didn’t think these were
important, but because they thought once the governments did their studies and
found what the price tag was, they would be concerned or, if not concerned,
staggered.”
106
Id.; see also Sielman et al., supra note .
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Certainly the complete protection afforded to Central Falls’ insured
creditors appears unwarranted and unfair.108 The unfolding model in
Jefferson County, Alabama, which spreads the cost of restructuring
widely, looks promising and may yet prove wiser than imposing the
whole burden on the uninsured actors in Central Falls.
V. CONCLUSION
Modern Chapter 9 litigation has been characterized by extraordinary
protections for municipal bondholders, and Central Falls is no exception.
Although not well understood by politicians, fear of contagion has
encouraged the adoption of legal arrangements that have limited the
bankruptcy courts’ ability to include bondholders in the cost of
restructuring municipal debt. This preference for bondholders (and, by
extension, their insurers) has meant increased misery for taxpayers and
retirees. Given that all of these actors appear to have been complicit to
some degree in the creation and maintenance of the fiscally imprudent
conditions that triggered bankruptcy and that evidence of true contagion
is modest, it is hard to justify special protections for bondholders.

108. See, e.g., Russ, supra note 72.

